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Introduction and summary
In April 2009, the world economy appeared to be in  
a free fall. Global trade in goods and services had 
fallen 15.8 percent over the final two quarters of 2008 
and the first quarter of 2009.1 This world trade collapse 
had been the largest three-quarter decline of the past 
40 years. Five months earlier, in November 2008, leaders 
of the Group of Twenty (G-20)—20 large economies 
that make up roughly 85 percent of the world’s economic 
activity2—had met in Washington, DC, and pledged 
to stabilize the world financial system and improve 
coordination of macroeconomic responses to the global 
financial crisis.3 
Despite monetary easing and fiscal stimulus in 
many economies, real economic activity continued  
to deteriorate over the next few months. Reconvening 
in April 2009 in London, the G-20 leaders had a full 
agenda, which included the following topics: the role 
of fiscal stimulus to promote recovery; the reform of 
banking and financial regulation; and the strengthen-
ing of the International Monetary Fund and the multi-
lateral development banks (MDBs), such as the World 
Bank Group. In addition, even though the world was 
in the midst of an unprecedented global financial crisis, 
the problem of international trade was unusually 
prominent on the agenda. 
Among the commitments made by the G-20 in 
London, two directly addressed international trade. 
First, leaders promised to “ensure availability of at 
least $250 billion over the next two years to support 
trade finance through our export credit and investment 
agencies and through the MDBs.”4 Second, they reaf-
firmed a commitment made at the earlier Washington, 
DC, summit to refrain from raising new barriers to trade 
in goods and services. Finally, as part of the general 
strategy to restore economic growth, they pointed out 
that “an unprecedented and concerted fiscal expansion” 
among the member economies would total $5 trillion 
by the end of 2010.5 If declining trade simply reflected 
declining economic activity, this fiscal expansion 
would be expected to have an important impact on 
global trade. 
Previous work6 has documented what many 
economists now refer to as the Great Trade Collapse 
of 2008–09, and has analyzed its potential causes.  
In this article, we review not only the unprecedented 
collapse of world trade in 2008–09, but also the equally 
dramatic trade recovery that took place in 2009–10. 
We look at these events in a historical context, by 
comparing them to previous trade contractions and 
recoveries. To gain a better understanding of the links 
between trade and broader economic conditions, we 
look at changes in the trade-to-gross-domestic-product 
(GDP) ratios of major economies across the globe be-
fore, during, and after the Great Trade Collapse. Then, 
we discuss three primary hypotheses that explain the 
trade collapse: 1) a decline in aggregate demand for 
all goods; 2) difficulties in obtaining trade finance; and 
3) rising trade barriers. We consider how three distinct 
policy actions—fiscal stimulus, funding for trade finance, 
and a commitment to refrain from trade barriers—might 
have affected both the collapse and the subsequent re-
covery. Finally, we review four prominent examples 
from the large literature examining the contributing 
factors to the recent collapse of global trade. 
Determining the relative degree to which the var-
ious demand- and supply-side factors contributed to the 
Great Trade Collapse is important for formulating the 
optimal policy response. Economists would like to deter-
mine if there are market failures or counterproductive 45 Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago
policies specific to trade that the government can or 
should correct. If research finds that weak domestic 
demand (resulting from falling consumer income, 
stronger preferences for saving over consumption, or 
high unemployment) is the prime cause of the sharp 
fall in trade, then there is not a clear mandate for gov-
ernment intervention except, perhaps, actions to address 
the overall recession. In contrast, if research shows 
that trade finance problems are slowing down world 
trade, the appropriate policy response might be inter-
ventions by the government or nongovernmental or-
ganizations in certain financial or insurance markets. 
For example, governments could subsidize the price 
of payment instruments, export credit insurance, or 
even working capital loans. Finally, if analysis shows 
that the government’s tariffs on imports or nontariff 
barriers to trade are behind a sharp decline in trade, 
then the best policy solution would be the removal  
of these government interventions from international 
goods markets. 
According to the literature, the global collapse  
in economic activity explains between 35 percent and 
80 percent of the Great Trade Collapse. The analysis 
we perform in this article estimates that declining  
aggregate demand explains 35–50 percent of the 
Great Trade Collapse. With regard to the recovery, 
our analysis finds a quantitatively larger puzzle; rising 
aggregate demand explains only 25–40 percent of the 
recovery in imports. The findings of the literature on 
the role of trade finance in the collapse are mixed, with 
one paper finding that tighter financial conditions likely 
had a moderate negative effect on trade volumes during 
the financial crisis of 2008–09. Further, in this article, 
we document the evolution of antidumping trade restric-
tions imposed by the United States and Canada over 
the past 40 years and conclude that there was no sig-
nificant increase in border restrictions by these two 
countries in 2008 or 2009. Thus, trade protection by 
these countries was not a cause of the collapse. In terms 
of the dramatic recovery in trade, the absence of explicit 
border barriers at least allowed the recovery to progress 
unhindered. The conclusion that changing aggregate 
demand was the major cause of both the dramatic col-
lapse in trade volumes in 2008–09 and the spectacular 
recovery in 2009–10 suggests that of all the policy 
actions, fiscal stimulus likely had the largest impact 
on the trade recovery. 
What was the Great Trade Collapse?
In this section, we document some stylized facts 
about the Great Trade Collapse of 2008–09 and the sub-
sequent recovery. Panel A of figure 1 documents the 
timing and magnitude of the Great Trade Collapse. 
The plotted series is the seasonally adjusted quarterly 
level of world trade measured in trillions of 2005 U.S. 
dollars. World trade of goods and services is defined 
as (X + M)/2, where X is world exports of goods and 
services and M is world imports of goods and services. 
The V-shaped path toward the end of panel A corre-
sponds to the collapse in world trade during the period 
2008:Q2–2009:Q2 and the equally rapid recovery from 
2009:Q2 onward. This world trade series from the 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Develop-
ment (OECD), which starts in 1968:Q2, demonstrates 
a clear upward trend. The level of world trade in 
2010:Q3 is more than 15 times the level in 1968:Q2. 
While international trade has been trending upward 
for more than four decades, with an annual growth 
rate of 6.48 percent, episodes of contraction have not 
been uncommon. Between 1974:Q2 and 1975:Q2, the 
world trade level declined by 7.65 percent; between 
1980:Q1 and 1980:Q3, it slid by 3.34 percent; between 
1981:Q4 and 1982:Q4, it slipped by 3.12 percent;  
and between 2000:Q4 and 2001:Q4, it decreased by 
3.51 percent. The Great Trade Collapse, which occurred 
between 2008:Q2 and 2009:Q2, was more severe than 
all the previous tumbles—the volume of world trade 
plummeted by 17.20 percent from peak to trough. 
In panel B of figure 1, the log of world trade in 
trillions of 2005 U.S. dollars is plotted. This series 
displays a clear linear trend. Notice that during the 
2000s, trade growth stood above the trend line until 
the collapse of 2008–09. Although a rapid recovery 
began after 2009:Q2, world trade has yet to return to 
its long-run linear trend. 
Next, we turn to the United States. Panel A of 
figure 2 shows real seasonally adjusted U.S. imports 
and exports. Like the rest of the world, the United 
States has seen fast growth in trade over the past few 
decades. From 1965 through 2010, U.S. imports grew 
at an annual rate of 6.03 percent and U.S. exports grew 
at an annual rate of 5.92 percent. During the Great 
Trade Collapse (2008:Q2–2009:Q2), U.S. real imports 
declined by 18.3 percent while U.S. real exports dropped 
by 14.7 percent. Given the rapid growth in trade over 
the previous five decades, the magnitude of the col-
lapse in exports and imports was truly astonishing.
Panel B of figure 2 shows the log levels of U.S. 
real imports and exports, which both display linear 
upward trends over time. Notice that the bumps and 
wiggles in the series for the United States are more 
apparent than in their counterparts for world trade in 
panel B of figure 1. These differences between world 
trade and U.S. trade measures are due to the fact that 
in world trade flows, a decline in one country’s trade 
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Notes: World trade is the sum of world exports in goods and services and world imports in goods and services divided by two. In each panel, 
the two dashed vertical lines indicate the peak and trough of the Great Trade Collapse (2008:Q2–2009:Q2). In panel B, the straight black line 
indicates the long-run linear trend.
Source: Authors’ calculations based on data from the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, Main Economic Indicators, 
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Note: The shaded areas indicate official U.S. periods of recession as identified by the National Bureau of Economic Research.
Source: Authors’ calculations based on data from the U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis, National Income and Product Accounts 
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Trade contractions and recoveries  
in historical perspective
How does the most recent trade collapse compare 
with previous episodes of trade contraction? And how 
does the current recovery in trade compare with previous 
recoveries? In figure 3, we present “spider graphs” that 
allow us to compare the magnitude and speed of differ-
ent trade contractions and recoveries. Panel A of figure 3 
presents several U.S. trade contractions and recoveries, 
while panel B of figure 3 presents trade contractions 
and recoveries for the world. In both panels A and B 
of figure 3, we normalize real, seasonally adjusted, 
quarterly data on trade, defined as (X + M)/2, to be equal 
to 100 in the quarter identified as the trough of each 
U.S. trade contraction. We identified the following quar-
ters as the troughs of U.S. episodes of trade contraction 
and recovery: 1975:Q2, 1980:Q3, 1982:Q4, 1991:Q1, 
2001:Q4, and 2009:Q2. Next, we investigate what 
happened to the volume of U.S. and world trade four 
quarters before and five quarters after these identified 
nadirs for U.S. trade. Numbers on the horizontal axes 
represent the number of quarters before and after the 
trough date; therefore, the number zero corresponds 
to the troughs. Numbers to the left of zero generally 
correspond to a period of decline in trade volume. Anal-
ogously, numbers to the right of zero generally corre-
spond to a period of recovery in trade volume. We 
refer to each episode of trade contraction and recovery 
by its trough date. 
In both panels, the solid black line stands out. 
The black lines (representing the 2009:Q2 episode) 
depict the changes in trade volume during the Great 
Trade Collapse of 2008–09 (and the subsequent re-
covery) for the United States and the world in panels 
A and B, respectively. A closer look at these spider 
graphs reveals the following facts. 
First, for both the United States and the world, 
the recent trade collapse is the most severe decline in 
trade since the late 1960s, in terms of both magnitude 
and speed. Notice that for both the United States and 
the world, sustained trade declines do not last more than 
four quarters. For the United States, the 1975:Q2, 
1982:Q4, and 2001:Q4 episodes all have four quar-
ters of contraction. In contrast, for the 1980:Q3 and 
1991:Q1 episodes in the United States, contractions 
lasted for only two quarters. The patterns of contraction 
in world trade are almost identical to those in the U.S. 
trade. An exception is the 1991:Q1 episode in which 
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Notes: Episodes of trade contraction and recovery for both the United States and the world are indicated by their trough dates. Panel A is  
based on U.S. trade data in figure 2. Panel B is based on world trade data in figure 1. For each panel’s vertical axis, the data are normalized  
to be equal to 100 for the indicated year and quarter. 
Sources: Authors’ calculations based on data from the U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis, National Income and Product Accounts of the 
United States, and Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, Main Economic Indicators, from Haver Analytics.48 2Q/2011, Economic Perspectives
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date  Contraction  Recovery  Contraction  Recovery
  ( - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -  percent  - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - )
1975:Q2  – 12.3  15.3  – 6.9  13.4
1980:Q3  – 0.4  4.3  1.1  6.3
1982:Q4  – 7.8  15.7  – 2.9  9.8
1991:Q1  – 0.6  9.0  4.7  7.7
2001:Q4  – 9.5  7.4  – 3.4  8.4
2009:Q2  – 15.8  16.0  – 13.6  14.4
Notes: Trade is (X + M)/2, where X is exports of goods and services and M 
is imports of goods and services. The underlying U.S. data series is reported  
in billions of 2005 chained U.S. dollars, seasonally adjusted. The underlying  
world data are reported in billions of 2005 U.S. dollars, seasonally adjusted.  
The averages of the annualized quarterly growth rates of trade are calculated  
during each trade episode’s contraction (four quarters before the trough) and  
recovery (five quarters after the trough). For the world’s 2009:Q2 episode,  
the recovery rate is calculated for four quarters after the trough.
Sources: Authors’ calculations based on data from the U.S. Bureau of Economic 
Analysis, National Income and Product Accounts of the United States, and 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, Main Economic 
Indicators, from Haver Analytics. 
  United States  World
Second, despite its huge magnitude, 
the Great Trade Collapse does not stand 
out as more protracted than previous epi-
sodes. Thus, a greater amount of trade de-
struction occurred in a period of typical 
duration for trade decline. One way to see 
this point is to compare the averages of the 
annualized quarterly growth rates of trade 
during the four quarters before the identi-
fied trough dates (see table 1). During  
the Great Trade Collapse (the 2009:Q2  
episode in table 1), U.S. trade fell, at  
an average annualized quarterly rate of  
–15.8 percent, and world trade dropped,  
at an average annualized quarterly rate of 
–13.6 percent. The trade contraction fol-
lowing in the wake of the oil crisis of 1973 
(the 1975:Q2 episode in table 1), the most 
similar in terms of magnitude, saw U.S. 
trade fall, at an average annualized rate  
of –12.3 percent.
Third, let us take a look at the right-
hand side of each panel in figure 3 and  
examine the recovery that followed each 
collapse. We notice that following the  
nadir of the Great Trade Collapse (2009:Q2), despite  
a remarkably fast recovery rate, as of 2010:Q2, both 
U.S. and world trade have yet to return to their pre-
collapse levels. For world trade, in all previous con-
tractions, trade volumes rebounded to their pre-collapse 
levels within four quarters. 
For the United States, a slow recovery in trade  
is not unprecedented. After the trade contraction  
associated with the dot-com recession of 2001 (that 
is, the 2001:Q4 episode in figure 3), it took eight quar-
ters for trade to rebound to its pre-contraction level. 
The trade recovery following the Great Trade Collapse 
has been faster than that following the dot-com bust. 
Five quarters after the nadir in 2009:Q2, U.S. trade 
volume had returned to 99.3 percent of its 2008:Q2 
level. Given the severity of the decline, this five- 
quarter rally has been impressive.
Finally, figure 3 suggests that there may be a syn-
chronicity between U.S. and world trade. The U.S. 
trough dates are identical with the world trough dates 
on most occasions. However, it is not clear from this 
figure if this synchronicity is due to the United States’ 
large share of world trade or due to changes in foreign 
trade flows that are truly synchronous with U.S. trade 
flows. We return to this issue later.
We now shift gears to examine U.S. imports and 
exports in order to understand the Great Trade Collapse 
and the subsequent recovery from another angle.  
Figure 4 disentangles the U.S. episodes of trade con-
traction and recovery into spider graphs of imports 
(panel A) and exports (panel B). All import episodes 
have a V-shaped path, while not all export episodes 
display this pattern. Apparently, imports played the 
more significant role in shaping the U.S. trade con-
traction episodes displayed in figure 3.
Let us first focus on U.S. imports in panel A of 
figure 4. Interestingly, with respect to imports, the Great 
Trade Collapse (the 2009:Q2 episode) looks similar 
to the trade contraction associated with the oil shock 
of 1973 (the 1975:Q2 episode). The magnitudes of 
the contractions over the four quarters before the trough 
date are similar. In fact, the average of the annualized 
quarterly growth rates of U.S. imports was –18.4 percent 
during the 1975:Q2 episode versus –17.2 percent during 
the 2009:Q2 episode. The magnitudes of the rebounds 
over the five quarters after the trough date are not too 
far off from each other. The average of the annualized 
quarterly growth rates of U.S. imports was 24.9 percent 
for the 1975:Q2 episode versus 17.8 percent for the 
2009:Q2 episode. Still, compared with the previous epi-
sodes of trade contraction, the collapse in U.S. imports 
in 2008–09 was among the most severe. When exam-
ining the rebounds in imports of the various episodes, 
we see that imports grew firmly, but not stunningly, after 
the Great Trade Collapse. On the one hand, a recovery 
of 17.8 percent for the 2009:Q2 episode has been much 49 Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago
faster than those of the 1980:Q3, 1991:Q1, and 
2001:Q4 episodes; on the other hand, the recovery 
speed for the 2009:Q2 episode has not been as fast as 
those for the 1975:Q2 and 1982:Q4 episodes. 
Next we turn to the export side in panel B of  
figure 4. Note that the Great Trade Collapse and the 
recovery following it (the 2009:Q2 episode) had the 
steepest and most symmetric V-shaped path around 
the trough date relative to all previous episodes. This 
makes the Great Trade Collapse and subsequent recovery 
look unique. Over the four quarters before the 2009:Q2 
trough date, the average of the annualized quarterly 
growth rates of exports was –13.9 percent, the largest 
rate of decline seen over the past four decades. The 
recovery over the five quarters after the 2009:Q2 trough 
date has been fast, with an average of the annualized 
quarterly growth rates of 12.7 percent. The momentum 
of the export recovery was rapid in the beginning but 
gradually faded. The export series during the Great 
Trade Collapse and subsequent recovery features a 
quick collapse and a quick rebound. 
The export contractions in the 2001:Q4 and 1982:Q4 
episodes look similar to that of the 2009:Q2 episode, 
although both of the earlier episodes feature slow  
recoveries. In contrast, the 1975:Q2, 1980:Q3, and 
1991:Q1 episodes do not have V-shaped paths. Take 
the 1975:Q2 episode, for example. During the collapse 
period, exports slid for a quarter, rebounded for two 
consecutive quarters, and then declined for two more 
quarters (past the trough date of imports for that epi-
sode). One quarter into the recovery, a brief reversal set 
in before a two-quarter rally that finally brought the 
export volume back to the level of 1974:Q2. Exports 
in the 1980:Q3 and 1991:Q1 episodes experienced little 
or no decline. Therefore, the brief trade contractions 
in the 1980:Q3 and 1991:Q1 episodes can be attributed 
almost exclusively to contractions in imports. 
To summarize, the behavior for U.S. imports dur-
ing the Great Trade Collapse and the subsequent recov-
ery look similar to that of previous episodes. However, 
the V-shaped pattern of U.S. exports during the Great 
Trade Collapse and the subsequent recovery bears little 
resemblance to the behavior of exports in previous epi-
sodes. The unique path of exports during the 2009:Q2 
episode appears to be driven by the strength of the 
2008–09 global recession, which we explore in more 
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Notes: Episodes of trade contraction and recovery for the United States are indicated by their trough dates, as in figure 3. Panel A is  
based on the import volume series and panel B is based on the export volume series in figure 2. For each panel’s vertical axis, the  
data are normalized to be equal to 100 for the indicated year and quarter.
Source: Authors’ calculations based on data from the U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis, National Income and Product Accounts 
of the United States, from Haver Analytics.50 2Q/2011, Economic Perspectives
Changes in trade and GDP
Trade volume usually rises or falls in accordance 
with the direction of the general economy, so we want 
to examine this interaction. For U.S. trade levels, if 
we refer to figure 2 (on p. 46), for example, we see 
that trade contractions usually occur during recessions. 
How do we think of a trade contraction in the context 
of broader economic conditions? For any country, by 
summing up imports and exports and then dividing 
this quantity by GDP, we obtain that country’s trade-to-
GDP ratio. Multiplying by 100 allows us to express 
this ratio as a percent. Figure 5 shows the nominal 
trade-to-GDP ratios of the United States, France,  
Japan, and Germany over the past few decades.  
Let us focus on the U.S. experience plotted in 
panel A of figure 5. This ratio was 8.85 percent in 
1965:Q1 and peaked in 2008:Q3 at 31.88 percent. 
The upward trend in the evolution of this ratio indicates 
that the growth in trade volume has outpaced the growth 
in GDP over the past few decades; trade’s role in the 
broader economy has expanded steadily. The trade-to-
GDP ratio can be thought of as a measure of the open-
ness of an economy to trade. The fact that the trade-to- 
GDP ratios for the United States, France, Japan, and 
Germany have all been trending upward over time shows 
that these countries have become more and more open 
to trade as part of their economic activities. This rise 
in openness is often referred to as globalization. 
Each country’s path to globalization is subject  
to its own historical idiosyncrasies. For example,  
the declines in the United States’ trade-to-GDP ratio  
occur close to U.S. recessions. During the period 
1974:Q4–1975:Q3, around the time of the first oil crisis, 
the trade-to-GDP ratio decreased from 17.6 percent to 
15.4 percent. Around the time that the dot-com bubble 
burst, in the period 2000:Q3–2001:Q4, the trade-to-
GDP ratio decreased from 26.3 percent to 22.0 percent. 
Finally, around the time of the global financial crisis, 
during the period 2008:Q3–2009:Q2, the trade-to-GDP 
ratio plummeted from 31.9 percent to 24.1 percent. 
For France (figure 5, panel B), fluctuations in  
the trade-to-GDP ratio follow a similar pattern to that 
observed for the United States. Starting at 26.3 percent 
in 1965:Q1, France’s trade-to-GDP ratio increased 
steadily over time, reaching 43.7 percent in 1974:Q3. 
When the oil shock set in, the trade-to-GDP ratio slid 
to 35.9 percent in 1975:Q3, and it did not surpass the 
pre-collapse level until 1980:Q1—five and a quarter 
years after the trough. For France, whenever there is 
a drop in the trade-to-GDP ratio, it takes a relatively 
long time to recover. France experienced a plodding 
recovery from the trade contraction of the early 2000s. 
In 2008:Q3, France’s trade-to-GDP ratio stood at  
56.6 percent, but it was crushed to 47.3 percent within 
three quarters. For France, the Great Trade Collapse 
appears to have precipitated a dip in the trade-to-GDP 
ratio following a relatively weak recovery from the 
earlier decline that coincided with the United States’ 
dot-com recession.  
Turning to Japan (figure 5, panel C), we see that 
the nominal trade-to-GDP ratio started from almost 
30 percent in the early 1980s. This ratio dropped dras-
tically following the 1985 Plaza Accord, under which 
the Japanese yen started to appreciate against other 
major world currencies. Japan’s trade-to-GDP ratio 
dropped from 27.3 percent in 1984:Q4 to 16.8 percent 
in 1988:Q1. After rising for a few years, this ratio 
took another dip in the early 1990s, when it declined 
to a low of 15.6 percent in 1993:Q4. Following that 
dip, the trade-to-GDP ratio recovered steadily. Since 
2001:Q4, Japan’s trade-to-GDP ratio had risen quickly, 
to a peak in 2008:Q3 of 38.6 percent. During the Great 
Trade Collapse, the trade-to-GDP ratio took a nose dive. 
Four quarters after the trough in 2009:Q2, Japan’s 
trade-to-GDP ratio had recovered only about half of 
the lost ground, standing at 30.0 percent. 
Germany’s trade-to-GDP ratio (figure 5, panel D) 
has trended upward, starting from 39.5 percent in 
1968:Q1 to reach a peak of 90.9 percent in 2008:Q3. 
The reunification of Germany in the early 1990s 
knocked this ratio down from 63.1 percent in 1990:Q4 
to 44.3 percent in 1993:Q4. Since then, the openness 
of Germany’s economy to trade had increased signifi-
cantly until the Great Trade Collapse. After peaking in 
2008:Q3, Germany’s trade-to-GDP ratio fell to 74.6 per-
cent in 2009:Q2, before beginning a sharp recovery. 
Examining the experiences of four major world 
economies displayed in figure 5, we conclude that in-
ternational trade has become more and more important 
to the global economy over time. What caused inter-
national trade to grow so explosively? In the post-World 
War II era, several factors have facilitated this meteoric 
growth in international trade: 1) the decline in tariffs 
under the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade/
World Trade Organization (GATT/WTO) system7 
(Crowley, 2003; and Subramanian and Wei, 2007),  
as well as a number of preferential trade agreements; 
2) the decline in transportation costs (Hummels, 2001, 
2007; and Levinson, 2006); 3) the rise of vertical spe-
cialization8 facilitated by the first two factors (Yi, 2003); 
and 4) the decline in communication costs (Freund 
and Weinhold, 2000).
Given the rising openness to trade around the world 
depicted in figure 5, the Great Trade Collapse stands out 
not only because of its magnitude, but also because it ap-
pears to have been highly synchronized across countries. 51 Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago
Let us now examine the synchronicity of the 
Great Trade Collapse and the subsequent recovery by 
reviewing the experience of a broader range of coun-
tries. Figure 6 is a scatter plot of the percentage change 
in trade versus the percentage change in real GDP over 
the period 2008:Q2–2009:Q2 for 29 countries.9 Three 
important facts emerge from this picture. 
First, the decline in trade was broadly spread 
across this entire set of countries. During this period, 
the least affected country plotted, that is, Brazil, had  
a change in trade of more than –7.5 percent. The most 
affected country, that is, Mexico, had a change in trade 
of –26.1 percent. The United States’ trade collapse, 
amounting to a change of –15.0 percent, fell right in 
the midrange of this cross section of countries. 
Second, with the exception of Australia, Poland, 
India, and Brazil, all countries displayed here experi-
enced declines in their GDP as well. Mexico again led 
the group, with a change of –10.0 percent. The United 
States experienced a –4.1 percent change in its GDP. 
Among the larger economies, Japan experienced a 
–5.9 percent change in GDP (as well as a –25.0 percent 
change in trade). 
Third, a fitted line through this scatter plot has a 
slope of 0.96, which indicates that a 1 percent decline 

















































Notes: In each panel, the trade-to-GDP ratio is defined as the sum of nominal imports and nominal exports divided by nominal GDP.  
Also, in each panel, the shaded areas indicate official U.S. periods of recession as identified by the National Bureau of Economic Research.
Sources: Authors’ calculations based on data from the U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis, Institut National de la Statistique et des Études 
Économiques of France, Cabinet Office of Japan, and Deutsche Bundesbank of Germany, from Haver Analytics. 
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trade. This picture highlights the global synchronicity 
of both the Great Recession and the Great Trade 
Collapse.10 
Figure 7 plots the recovery following the Great 
Trade Collapse, using data from 2009:Q2 through 
2010:Q1. From this figure we see that most countries 
were recovering from the Great Recession during this 
period; only Spain, Greece, and Israel saw GDP de-
creasing over the period 2009:Q2–2010:Q1. India 
(omitted from the figure) was a strong outlier, with 
dramatic GDP growth of 21.8 percent over this period. 
The figure also demonstrates that the recovery of trade 
has been widespread and, for many countries, strong. 
Only Greece and Finland continued to experience  
declines in trade after 2009:Q2. 
To conclude, the highly synchronized nature of the 
global trade collapse that occurred in 2008–09 and the 
subsequent recovery suggests that analytical models 
of the Great Trade Collapse should be global in nature. 
What caused the Great Trade Collapse  
and the subsequent recovery?
What was behind the sharp decline in world 
trade that began in the second quarter of 2008? And 
what is behind the amazingly quick recovery in trade 
that we are experiencing today? The facts that we have 
gleaned from the data can help guide our analysis. First, 
we know that the Great Trade Collapse was extremely 
severe and steep by historical standards. Second, trade 
fell more dramatically than GDP around the world. 
Third, compared with previous episodes in which U.S. 
imports and exports fell, this trade collapse was much 
more highly synchronized around the world. In forming 
hypotheses to explain the causes of a phenomenon 
like the Great Trade Collapse, economists often begin 
with a simple supply-and-demand framework. If the 
quantity of imports falls during a recession, one likely 
culprit for this decrease is the decline in consumers’ 
incomes, which reduces consumer demand for all goods, 
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including imports. In other words, as consumers tight-
ened their belts and bought fewer domestically produced 
goods, they also chose to buy fewer imported goods. 
However, we know that during the Great Trade Collapse, 
imports fell much more rapidly than income. 
Are there complicating factors behind a decline 
in consumer demand for imports? Possibly. As can be 
seen in figure 1 (p. 46), global trade began to take off 
in the mid-1990s. While there were many forces at work, 
a key element in this transition was the rise of global 
supply chains. Because companies now spread their 
production processes across multiple countries, the 
production of a specific good—for example, a car— 
involves multiple border crossings of a partially com-
pleted car that becomes more valuable with every step 
in the production process and every border crossing. 
Because customs agencies record the total value of 
every object that crosses the border and not the value 
added to the object during its most recent trip to a coun-
try, the value of trade recorded by national customs 
agencies has grown more rapidly than GDP as more and 
more companies and industries have spread their pro-
duction processes across many countries. It is difficult 
to precisely measure the importance of trade in inter-
mediate goods (for example, an engine or brake for a 
car). That said, one OECD study11 estimates that the 
average annual growth rate of trade in intermediate 
goods among OECD members was 6.20 percent over 
the period 1995–2006, whereas the average annual 
growth rate in the trade of final consumption goods was 
only 5.87 percent over the same period. This finding 
suggests that the share of intermediate goods in total 
trade flows has been increasing as global supply chains 
have spread.
In the Great Trade Collapse, we might have been 
observing the rapid unwinding of these global supply 
chains. Within a vertically integrated international 
economy,12 a simple fall in consumer demand for im-
ports would have been magnified through the global 
supply chains. For every car that is not produced and 
sold to a consumer, trade flows as measured by customs 
authorities fell by more than the final value of the car 
because that car, which would have crossed several 
borders during its production, did not cross any borders. 
So, in addition to falling consumer demand, this com-
plication generated by various multicountry production 
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processes may have played a significant role in pre-
cipitating and/or exacerbating the Great Trade Collapse. 
Another complicating feature of the demand side 
is that there are compositional differences between 
imports and national income, or GDP. Consider the 
United States’ imports and national income. The vast 
majority of imports into the United States are goods— 
for example, food, clothing, cars, and electronics—
but some of these imports are services—for example, 
education, travel, and business consulting services. 
Our national income consists largely of services—for 
example, health care and education—with goods playing 
a much smaller role in our economy today than they 
have in the past. We might expect that consumption 
of some domestically produced services like health care 
is more recession-proof than the consumption of typi-
cally imported goods like televisions and refrigerators. 
How much of the Great Trade Collapse (and the sub-
sequent recovery) was due to a difference in the rela-
tive composition of tradable versus domestically 
produced goods and services? 
Returning to our simple framework, we note that 
the other likely cause of the recent trade collapse would 
be some type of disruption on the supply side—that is, 
some factor that affects the firms that are producing 
goods and shipping them to consumers and retail out-
lets. During the recent global recession, which started 
with a global financial crisis, the costs associated with 
exporting were carefully monitored for their potential 
impact on trade flows. Because the crisis was a finan-
cial one, governments and international organizations, 
such as the WTO and World Bank, tried to collect in-
formation on the costs of financing trade. Given the 
tight financial environment during the crisis, did firms 
face difficulty in obtaining different types of financing 
for their international shipments? In addition, were 
there problems associated with rising trade protection 
during the recent recession? It is widely known that 
the United States increased import tariffs during the 
Great Depression and that this likely worsened the  
severity of the depression during the 1930s. Did 
something similar happen this time around to cause 
or exacerbate the Great Trade Collapse? 
Demand-side explanations 
Is it surprising that trade collapsed during the  
recent global recession? As we discussed previously, 
the Great Trade Collapse was coincident with the largest 
decline in world GDP in decades. Should we not have 
expected that consumers, who buy less of everything 
during a recession, would also buy fewer imported 
goods? How can economists assess this problem on 
the demand side quantitatively? 
To predict how exports or imports will change  
in the future, economists routinely estimate trade 
elasticities. Trade elasticities with respect to income 
measure how much a country’s imports or exports 
will change in response to changes in national income.13 
For example, the import elasticity with respect to in-
come is a number that specifies how much imports 
will increase in response to a 1 percent increase in the 
total income of a country. Economic theory posits that 
this elasticity is positive. That is, an increase in a coun-
try’s income leads it to buy more from foreign countries. 
Moreover, an income elasticity of imports that is equal 
to one implies that imports increase proportionately 
with national income. 
For the past several decades, estimates of the im-
port elasticity with respect to income for the United 
States have ranged from 1.5 to slightly more than two.14 
That is, in the United States, imports respond more 
than proportionately to changes in income. Precisely 
how much more depends on the exact value of the 
elasticity. In table 2, we list reported estimates of the 
import elasticity with respect to income for the United 
States by several different researchers. Using infor-
mation on the decline in U.S. GDP over the period 
2008:Q2–2009:Q2, we can predict how large the U.S. 
decline in imports must have been in order to be in 
line with historical norms. Specifically, the actual  
cumulative change in U.S. GDP over this time period 
was –4.1 percent. In table 2, we use import elasticities 
with respect to income to predict the decline in imports 
during the Great Trade Collapse (2008:Q2–2009:Q2). 
Predictions for the change in U.S. imports range from 
a low of –6.2 percent, using a historical estimate from 
Houthakker and Magee (1969), to a high of –9.4 percent, 
using the more recent estimate from Chinn (2004) 
(the fourth column of table 2). But the cumulative 
change in imports over the period 2008:Q2–2009:Q2 
was actually –18.3 percent. Estimates of the import 
elasticity with respect to income indicate that the decline 
in U.S. national income during the Great Trade Collapse 
can explain only about 35 percent to 50 percent of the 
decline in U.S. imports (see the last column of table 2). 
This simple analysis of demand-side factors tells us 
that imports fell about twice as much as we would 
have expected! 
How unusual is the Great Trade Collapse in this 
regard? That is, if we examine the other major contrac-
tions in U.S. imports since the 1970s, how do they com-
pare? Table 3 compares the Great Trade Collapse with 
five previous import contraction episodes in the United 
States. The first column lists the trough date of each 
of the six major contractions in U.S. imports reported 
earlier in figures 3 and 4 (pp. 47 and 49). The second 55 Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago
 
Predicted vs. actual change in U.S. imports, 2008:Q2–2009:Q2
TaBlE 2
    Import    Predicted change
  Sample  elasticity with  Predicted percent  in imports/actual
Previous research  period  respect to income  change in imports  change in imports 
Houthakker and Magee (1969)   1951–66   1.51   – 6.2   0.34 
Hooper, Johnson, and Marquez (2000)   1961–94   1.79   – 7.3   0.40 
Chinn (2004)   1975–2003   2.29   – 9.4   0.51 
Cardarelli and Rebucci (2007)   1972–2006   2.03   – 8.3   0.45
Crane, Crowley, and Quayyum (2007)   1960–2006   1.93   – 7.9   0.43 
Note: See the text for further details.
Source: Authors’ calculations based on data from the U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis, National Income and Product Accounts of the 
United States, from Haver Analytics.
 
Predicted vs. actual change in U.S. imports during episodes of trade contraction
TaBlE 3
  Percent change  Predicted  Actual  Predicted change
Trough date of the import   in U.S. gross  percent change  percent change   in imports/actual
contraction episode  domestic product  in imports  in imports  change in imports
1975:Q2  – 1.8  – 3.5  – 19.5  0.18
1980:Q3  – 1.6  – 3.1  – 12.0  0.26
1982:Q4  – 1.4  – 2.7  – 3.9  0.69
1991:Q1  – 1.0  – 1.9  – 4.3  0.44
2001:Q4  0.4  0.8  – 7.8  N.A.
2009:Q2  – 4.1  – 7.9  – 18.3  0.43
Notes: N.A. indicates not applicable. See the text for further details.
Source: Authors’ calculations based on data from the U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis, National Income and Product Accounts of the 
United States, from Haver Analytics.
column presents the cumulative decline in U.S. real 
GDP over the four quarters before the trough date. 
The third column displays the implied change in U.S. 
real imports over the four quarters before the trough 
date; we derive these values by multiplying the change 
in real GDP in the second column with the estimate 
of the import elasticity with respect to income (1.93) 
from Crane, Crowley, and Quayyum (2007). In the 
fourth column, we report the actual percent change  
in U.S. real imports over the four quarters before the 
trough date. Interestingly, in almost all cases the actu-
al changes in trade were substantially larger than the 
predicted changes in the third column. The last column 
lists the ratio of the predicted change in imports to the 
actual change in imports, which reveals how much  
of the decline in imports over the four quarters con-
sidered may be due to a decline in GDP over the same 
period. It appears that declining aggregate demand 
varies considerably in its importance as a cause for 
these trade declines. Thus, other factors, such as 
changing relative prices, trade barriers, or costs of 
conducting international trade, must also contribute 
to these trade contractions.  
An import elasticity analysis of the trade recov-
ery from 2009:Q2 through 2010:Q2 leaves us with  
a quantitatively even larger puzzle. Over the period 
2009:Q2–2010:Q2, U.S. GDP grew 3.0 percent, but 
U.S. imports of goods and services skyrocketed up 
17.4 percent. Turning to table 4, we see that this dramatic 
increase in imports cannot be well explained simply 
by an improvement in aggregate demand. Table 4’s  
final column indicates that the increase in U.S. national 
income can explain only about one-quarter to 40 percent 
of the recovery following the Great Trade Collapse. 
As we stated before, during the Great Trade  
Collapse, a decline in U.S. aggregate income can ex-
plain only about half of the decline in imports. Similarly, 
when U.S. GDP began to recover after this collapse, 
U.S. imports surged well beyond the improvement 
predicted by the United States’ import elasticity with 
respect to income. So what other forces account for 56 2Q/2011, Economic Perspectives
 
Predicted vs. actual change in U.S. imports, 2009:Q2–2010:Q2
TaBlE 4
    Import    Predicted change
  Sample  elasticity with  Predicted percent  in imports/actual
Previous research  period  respect to income  change in imports  change in imports 
Houthakker and Magee (1969)   1951–66   1.51   4.5  0.26
Hooper, Johnson, and Marquez (2000)   1961–94   1.79   5.4  0.31
Chinn (2004)   1975–2003   2.29   6.9  0.40
Cardarelli and Rebucci (2007)   1972–2006   2.03   6.1  0.35
Crane, Crowley, and Quayyum (2007)   1960–2006   1.93   5.8  0.33
 
Note: See the text for further details. 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on data from the U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis, National Income and Product Accounts of the 
United States, from Haver Analytics.
the unexplained movements in U.S. imports during 
the collapse and the recovery? 
To address this question, we next examine some-
what detailed data on U.S. imports in order to identify 
compositional changes in imports that occurred over 
the period 2008–10. 
First, let us examine changes in U.S. imports of 
goods and services. Figure 8 plots real U.S. imports 
of goods versus services since the mid-1960s. A sig-
nificant decline and recovery occurred for imports of 
goods over the period 2008–10. Although the services 
industry plays a large role in the U.S. economy today, 
goods cross borders more often than services and were 
hit harder during the Great Trade Collapse. Over the 
period 2008:Q2–2009:Q2, U.S. imports of goods fell 
by 21.1 percent, while U.S. imports of services fell 
by only 3.5 percent. On the recovery side, from 
2009:Q2 through 2010:Q3, U.S. imports of goods in-
creased 18.4 percent, while U.S. imports of services 
increased by only 6.2 percent. From these observations, 
we conclude that the Great Trade Collapse and the 
subsequent recovery were driven by changes in the 
trade of goods. 
Naturally, oil is suspected as one large factor be-
hind the Great Trade Collapse. Earlier we discussed 
the oil crisis of 1973 as a factor in a previous large 
trade contraction. How big a role did oil play in the 
most recent trade episode? Figure 9 plots real U.S. 
imports of petroleum and nonpetroleum goods in billions 
of chained 2005 dollars. We see that, although petro-
leum imports have grown over time, their importance  
as a share of all imports has declined. In 1974:Q2, oil 
represented 45.0 percent of U.S. goods imports, but by 
the time of the Great Trade Collapse in 2008:Q2, oil’s 
share of U.S. goods imports had fallen to 13.4 percent. 
Moreover, the peak-to-trough decline in oil imports 
of 13.4 percent during the trade contraction of 
1974:Q2–1975:Q2 was substantially larger than the 
7.0 percent decline that occurred during the Great 
Trade Collapse (2008:Q2–2009:Q2). Taken together, 
these facts indicate that oil imports played a relatively 
modest role in the most recent U.S. trade contraction. 
Having reviewed the role of trade in petroleum 
goods, we now focus on manufactured goods, which 
consist of durables and nondurables. In contrast to the 
modest decline in oil imports, U.S. imports of nonoil 
goods imports fell by 24.3 percent over the period 
2008:Q2–2009:Q2. Figure 10 plots U.S. trade of non-
durable and durable goods. The decline in trade of 
durable goods—for example, automobiles, washing 
machines, and industrial machinery—was more severe 
than the decline in trade of nondurable goods—for 
example, clothing and food. During the Great Trade 
Collapse (2008:Q2–2009:Q2), imports in nondurable 
goods declined by 10.98 percent, while imports in  
durable goods declined by 28.6 percent; over the same 
period, U.S. exports in nondurable goods declined by 
6.8 percent, while exports of durable goods declined by 
24.3 percent. These findings suggest that an economic 
model that hopes to successfully quantify the contribu-
tions of various factors to the Great Trade Collapse 
should be characterized by a unique role for trade in 
durable goods. 
Supply-side explanations 
At the start of the 2008 economic crisis, policy-
makers observed that trade was falling dramatically 
and began to question the cause. Anything that reduces 
trade by raising the cost of selling a good in a foreign 
market is considered a supply-side cause. Two problems 
immediately raised concern. First, given that the world 
was in the midst of a financial crisis, policymakers ques-
tioned whether there was difficulty in obtaining trade 
finance. Second, policymakers questioned whether there 
was a rise in trade protection—that is, increases in import 
taxes or other government-sponsored barriers to trade. 57 Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago
Financial difficulties associated with trade
Before discussing trade finance with respect to the 
Great Trade Collapse, it is useful to review the differ-
ent types of trade finance. The payment methods for 
internationally traded goods differ from those used 
for goods that are bought and sold 
domestically because there is a high-
er risk of nonpayment. If a seller 
gives merchandise to a domestic 
purchaser and the purchaser does 
not pay, the seller can take the pur-
chaser to court. However, when the 
seller and purchaser are in different 
countries and the purchaser does 
not pay, it can be costly for the seller 
to get what is owed from the pur-
chaser. To mitigate this problem, 
banks can get involved in the pay-
ment process for international sales. 
Most trade—80–85 percent—
occurs without any formal financing 
and/or insurance arrangements with 
banks.15 Still, banks are involved in 
such international trading activity. 
An “open account” payment is made 
by the purchaser’s (importer’s) bank 
to the seller’s (exporter’s) bank after 
the purchaser receives the goods. 
However, banks are not extending 
loans or offering insurance under 
open account transactions. This is 
the least secure method of payment 
for a seller; hence, this method is 
most frequently used between parties 
that have a well-established, long-
standing relationship. Because there 
is no guarantee, verification, or in-
surance supplied by a third party, 
payment for merchandise on an 
open account is the cheapest way  
to process a transaction. 
The remaining 15–20 percent 
of world trade is financed through 
“letters of credit,” “documentary 
collections,” and similar products 
provided by banks or other third 
parties.16 These instruments, which 
come in many varieties, are payment 
methods in which a payment is re-
leased from the buyer’s (importer’s) 
bank to the seller’s (exporter’s) 
bank after certain documents have 
been presented to the buyer’s bank 
that verify delivery of the merchandise. Different types 
of these payment methods involve different levels of 
verification. The cost of using these products generally 
increases as the level of verification becomes more 
stringent, with letters of credit being more stringent and 
FIGuRE 8
U.S. imports of goods and services, 1965–2010
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U.S. imports of petroleum and nonpetroleum goods, 1965–2010
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more costly than most other products. According to 
the International Chamber of Commerce Banking 
Commission (2010), the cost of commercial letters of 
credit had increased during the recent financial crisis. 
The price of a letter of credit varies according to factors 
like the country of origin, the destination country, and 
the industrial sector. The International Chamber of 
Commerce survey evidence shows that prices of such 
letters increased by as much as 300–400 basis points 
over interbank lending rates during the height of the 
financial crisis in the fall of 2008.17 
To assess whether financing difficulties with these 
payment instruments were a likely cause of the Great 
Trade Collapse, we need information on the quantities 
of financial instruments sold, their prices, and the vol-
ume of trade. Two prominent surveys18 were undertaken 
in early 2009 to try to fill in the gaps in policymakers’ 
knowledge about trade finance. While reports explaining 
both surveys inform our understanding of the trade  
finance situation during the crisis, both are thin on hard 
statistics. The reports indicate that in the uncertain envi-
ronment of the financial crisis, there was a relative in-
crease in demand for more secure methods of payment, 
such as letters of credit. However, because of the dif-
ficulty in obtaining data on the number of open account 
transactions involving merchandise trade,19 it is not 
possible to evaluate how the proportions of unsecured 
versus more secured methods of payment changed during 
the crisis. While the surveys show that exporters sought 
out more secure payment methods as the crisis worsened, 
the total volume of letters of credit and documentary 
collections fell. Presumably, this occurred because trade 
fell. Lastly, according to the International Chamber of 
Commerce Banking Commission (2010), refusals of 
payments on minor technicalities increased through-
out the crisis and remained high in early 2010. These 
refusals were possible because even though letters of 
credit promise payment when documents are presented, 
a bank can refuse to make a payment if there are small 
discrepancies in the paperwork that is filed. 
To summarize, it appears that the cost of trading 
goods internationally likely increased during the Great 
Trade Collapse as exporters, worried about nonpayment, 
began to use more secure and expensive methods of 
payment. However, the precise magnitude of this cost 
increase is not known. 
What about other areas of trade financing? Letters 
of credit and documentary collections are not the only 
method of insuring payment by a foreign buyer. Export 
credit insurance can be purchased by exporting firms 
so that they are paid in the event of nonpayment by a 
foreign purchaser. As the recent global recession 
worsened, it appears that the use of export credit in-
surance increased from roughly 9 percent of world trade 
in 2008 to 11 percent of world trade in 2009.20 Claims 
paid to insured customers by members of the Berne 
Union, the leading international organization for export 
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to 2009—from $1.1 billion to $2.4 billion. While this 
is a substantial increase, it covers only a small percent-
age of world merchandise trade (exports) in 2008, which 
the World Trade Organization (2009) estimated at 
$15.8 trillion. 
A third way in which the financial system can af-
fect international trade flows is through the provision 
of trade credit. Recall that transactions on an open  
account involve funds transfers between the buyer’s 
bank and the seller’s bank, but do not involve a loan 
from a bank. Rather, this type of sale is recorded as  
a positive “accounts receivable” for the exporter and, 
thus, is an informal loan from the exporter to the im-
porter. The provision of trade credit is more common 
in some industries than in others. For example, Chor 
and Manova (2010) calculate the amount of trade credit 
provided to buyers by suppliers in North America from 
1996 through 2005.21 Industries such as transportation 
equipment manufacturing, which has a North American 
Industry Classification System (NAICS) code of 336, 
and fabricated metal product manufacturing (NAICS 
332) receive relatively more trade credit than industries 
such as textile product mills (NAICS 314) or chemical 
manufacturing (NAICS 325). During the financial crisis, 
as the cost of borrowing money from a bank rose, it 
would have become more expensive for exporting 
firms to extend trade credit to their purchasers. 
While the rising cost of trade credit affects all 
firms that typically extend trade credit to their purchasers, 
there are reasons to believe that the problem could have 
been more severe for exporting firms. Domestic-market-
oriented businesses as well as export-oriented businesses 
often obtain working capital loans from banks to cover 
the cost of purchasing inputs, paying workers, or renting 
equipment. They repay these loans after receiving pay-
ment from a buyer. For exported shipments, the time 
lag between the shipment of goods and payment receipt 
is 30–90 days longer than for domestic transactions.22 
This means that working capital loans are especially 
important for export-oriented firms. 
To reiterate, an analysis of international trade pay-
ment methods is not going to provide much important 
information about whether the financial crisis had a 
unique impact on trade. While survey data suggest that 
costs of payment methods and export credit insurance 
increased, precise quantitative data are not available 
for economists to analyze. Economic research on the 
role of finance in the Great Trade Collapse will likely 
be more fruitful if it focuses on traditional credit instru-
ments—such as working capital loans and trade credit. 
The role of trade protection in the Great Trade Collapse 
Before diving into a description of how trade 
policy changed during the Great Trade Collapse, it is 
useful to review the general trends in trade protection 
leading up to September 2008. A dramatic reduction 
in tariff rates and other nontariff barriers to trade  
began with the end of World War II; this reduction, 
combined with reductions in transportation and com-
munication costs, led to dramatic increases in global 
trade that outpaced the growth of global economic  
activity for the past few decades. Under the auspices 
of trade agreements like the World Trade Organization’s 
GATT,23 most countries around the world have, to a 
large degree, given up their unilateral authority to 
raise trade barriers. Members of the WTO agree to  
refrain from raising tariffs or imposing quotas above 
certain “bound” limits in exchange for the same cour-
tesy from other countries. 
However, the GATT gives countries permission 
to use some forms of trade protection under a variety 
of special agreements or exceptional clauses. For ex-
ample, a special tariff known as an antidumping duty 
can be imposed on specific products imported from a 
single country if a variety of economic criteria are met. 
However, this type of country-specific trade restriction 
has been found to be porous;24 if the United States 
restricts imports of a product from Japan by using an 
antidumping duty, another country like Germany will 
simply increase its exports of that same product to the 
United States, leading to, at most, a small reduction 
in total U.S. imports of that product. Economists know 
less about the effects of nontariff forms of trade pro-
tection. Government intervention into markets, regula-
tory changes, and changes in administrative procedures 
or health or environmental policies can be subjected 
to GATT disciplines if their trade-distorting effects 
are large. These less transparent policies can be difficult 
to identify, but organizations that run efforts like the 
Global Trade Alert database25 have begun the difficult 
task of compiling information about such policies and 
then analyzing their effects. 
Did we observe dramatic increases in trade barriers 
at the time of the Great Trade Collapse? No. Growing 
evidence suggests that, to date, trade protection has 
been more muted than expected and its trade-distorting 
effect has been mild at best.26 
Figure 11 presents the recent state of U.S. trade 
protection activity under the antidumping duty. This 
is a special duty that the United States can use to restrict 
imports when a domestic industry is suffering injury— 
typically measured as reductions in employment and 
capacity utilization27 as well as reduced profitability—
by reason of “dumped,” or unfairly priced, imports. 60 2Q/2011, Economic Perspectives
We plot of the frequency of newly initiated antidump-
ing investigations and new antidumping import restric-
tions in the United States from 1979 through 2009, as 
well as the level of U.S. imports in billions of chained 
2005 U.S. dollars. 
In figure 11, the height of the light blue bar mea-
sures the number of new investigations that the U.S. 
government conducted into allegations of unfairly priced 
imports, while the height of the dark blue bar records 
how many of these investigations ultimately resulted 
in trade-reducing antidumping duties. The unit of ob-
servation is an investigation held into or trade restriction 
imposed against an individual country that exports to 
the United States.28 The tallest bar on the graph is in 
1992; the light blue bar indicates that the U.S. govern-
ment conducted 94 investigations into allegations of 
dumping, and the dark blue bar indicates that 39 of these 
investigations found evidence of dumping and, con-
sequently, resulted in trade-restricting import duties. 
Superimposed over this graph of antidumping 
activity, the black line indicates the real volume of 
U.S. imports, in billions of chained 2005 U.S. dollars. 
It shows a strong and steady increase in U.S. imports 
that declined quite dramatically in 2008 and 2009. 
We can clearly see that for the United States, there 
were increases in both the number of antidumping  
investigations and the number of investigations that 
resulted in new antidumping duties in 2008 and 2009 
relative to the pre-crisis years of 2005 and 2006. 
Moreover, these did occur as U.S. imports were falling. 
However, this rise in antidumping protection is consid-
erably smaller than the jumps in trade protection during 
earlier recessions. Previous spikes in antidumping activ-
ity coincided with the period of the strong U.S. dollar 
in the mid-1980s, the wake of the 1990–91 recession, 
and, most recently, the 2001 recession. Further, when 
we compare the number of antidumping investigations 
that resulted in duties to the total volume of U.S. imports, 
we see that the fraction of U.S. imports subject to an-
tidumping duties appears to be quite low in 2008–09. 
Our principal observation here is that antidumping activi-
ty, which has been the most popular method of trade 
protection in the United States since 1980, did not  
increase significantly during the crisis. 
Figure 12 depicts the same information for Canada 
over the period 1985–2009. The key observation is 
that the pattern is quite similar to that in the United 
States. There was a small uptick in activity in 2008 
over 2007, but the use of antidumping trade restrictions 
was quite modest by recent historical standards. Further, 
when we compare the recent use of antidumping duties 
to the total volume of Canadian trade, it appears to  
be trivial. 
How did trade protection evolve during the Great 
Recession? For most countries, there have not been 
substantial increases in explicit border measures like 
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Source: Authors’ calculations based on data from Bown (2010). 
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tariffs or quotas. If countries are changing their domestic 
regulations, administrative procedures, or health and 
safety standards in ways that discriminate against im-
ported goods (and thus have trade-restricting effects), 
these types of measures can be difficult for business 
people and policymakers to observe. Further, even 
when a potentially trade-distorting policy like the 
“Buy American” provision of the 2009 U.S. stimulus 
bill is well known, its trade impact can be difficult for 
economists to measure. 
While nontariff barriers could have a negative  
effect on trade, existing evidence from initiatives like 
the Global Trade Alert project suggests that the use of 
these policies has been restrained. The effect of major 
industrial policy initiatives on trade (for example, the 
General Motors bailout in the United States) has yet 
to be formally analyzed by researchers. 
Summarizing the hypotheses behind  
the Great Trade Collapse
To summarize, we posited three leading hypotheses 
for what caused the collapse: 1) a decline in aggregate 
demand for all goods, including imports; 2) difficulties 
in obtaining trade finance; and 3) rising trade barriers. 
A quick analysis has suggested that the fall in aggregate 
demand can explain about half of the decline of imports 
into the United States. Our review of the changing com-
position of imports suggests that to fully understand 
how declining demand affected trade during the Great 
Recession, a richer economic analysis that examines the 
structure of production and the composition of consump-
tion and trade is needed. With regard to trade finance, 
we explained why the lack of data on open account 
transactions makes it difficult to draw conclusions from 
the available data on payment methods for international 
trade. More fruitful avenues of research would examine 
how working capital loans and the provision of trade 
credit could have been mechanisms through which 
the recent global financial crisis reduced trade flows. 
Finally, with regard to trade protection, it seems that 
changes in traditional border barriers were not behind 
the trade collapse. In fact, governments’ willingness 
to refrain from trade restrictions allowed the trade re-
covery to progress swiftly. However, as high unemploy-
ment persists in much of the industrialized world, the 
calls for more trade protection and accusations of cur-
rency manipulation have been rising. Interestingly, in 
figure 11, the United States’ aggressive use of antidump-
ing duties associated with the 1990–91 recession peaked 
not during the recession itself, but in 1992, as high 
unemployment persisted with the United States’ “job-
less recovery.” 
Recent research on the Great Trade Collapse
A large literature is emerging on the causes of 
the Great Trade Collapse. Here, we summarize and 
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review four important contributions. Each of these 
papers uses a different methodology and emphasizes 
different aspects of the trade collapse. From them, we 
can glean a composite picture of the collapse and be-
gin to quantify the contributions of underlying causes. 
This, in turn, will guide us in assessing the policy actions 
undertaken by the G-20. Recall, as a starting point, 
that the simple trade elasticity analysis from table 2 
(p. 55) indicates that the decline in U.S. aggregate de-
mand explains around 35–50 percent of the United 
States’ import collapse. What have other researchers 
learned about the causes of the Great Trade Collapse? 
Levchenko, Lewis, and Tesar (2010)
Levchenko, Lewis, and Tesar (2010) ask how im-
portant was declining aggregate demand in explaining 
the collapse of trade in the United States. Their analy-
sis uses highly disaggregated data on trade flows and 
finds that the greatest declines occurred in sectors in 
which vertical production linkages29 are most important. 
In contrast, they find little to no evidence that trade  
financial difficulties were behind the United States’ 
trade collapse. 
Their paper proceeds in three distinct phases. First, 
they present data documenting the scale and industrial 
composition of the Great Trade Collapse in the United 
States. Second, they conduct a “trade wedge” analysis 
of macroeconomic data (which is discussed further in 
the next paragraph). Third, finding that a large portion 
of the United States’ trade collapse cannot be explained 
by declining aggregate demand, they examine other 
possible causes of the collapse. They undertake a cross-
sectional industry analysis of 1) vertical linkages among 
firms, 2) financial constraints, and 3) differences in 
the composition of trade and domestic demand to 
identify the most important causes of the Great Trade 
Collapse outside of falling aggregate demand. 
The “trade wedge” analysis is similar to the predic-
tions made using trade elasticities, which we presented 
earlier. The idea is to determine the “wedge,” or differ-
ence, between the actual decline in trade and the decline 
in trade that is due to changes in demand and changes 
in relative prices. The authors begin with a standard 
import demand function that relates changes in imports 
to changes in the price of domestic goods relative to 
the price of imported goods and to changes in consump-
tion and investment in the importing country. This 
function assumes that domestically produced and for-
eign goods are imperfect substitutes for one another 
and that the amount of imports increases as the price 
of domestically produced goods rises relative to the 
price of foreign goods. Further, imports increase as 
the total amount of domestic consumption and invest-
ment increase. Import demand is given by:
1) ( ) ( ), f + y ε P  f  –p D =
∧ ∧ ∧ ∧
where D = C + I;  f y
∧  is the change over time in the 
logged level of imports; ε is the elasticity of substitution
between domestic and foreign goods; P 
∧
 is the change 
in the log of domestic prices; p
∧
f is the change in the 
log of import prices; and D
∧
 is the change in the log 
of total consumption and investment in the importing 
country. Following previous research, the authors  
assume that ε is equal to 1.5. They use this equation 
to predict the magnitude of the decline in U.S. imports 
over the period 2008:Q2–2009:Q2, given the actual 
quarterly data on changes in relative prices and changes 
in U.S. consumption and investment from this period. 
There are two important distinctions between 
this analysis and our analysis using trade elasticities. 
First, Levchenko, Lewis, and Tesar (2010) include a 
measure for relative prices. Inclusion of these price 
measures should increase the predictive power of their 
model relative to a trade elasticity analysis that only 
examines changes in demand. Second, they assume 
that the import elasticity with respect to income is  
one, roughly half the magnitude of the empirical esti-
mates reported in table 2 (p. 55). From their analysis, 
Levchenko, Lewis, and Tesar find that their standard 
import demand equation explains 60 percent of the 
decline in imports. The wedge is a 40 percent differ-
ence between the actual decline in imports during this 
period and the decline in imports predicted by their 
import demand equation.
To demonstrate the uniqueness of the Great Trade 
Collapse as an economic phenomenon, Levchenko, 
Lewis, and Tesar (2010) calculate the size of the wedge 
for every year-over-year change30 since 1968. They 
find that the average wedge has been 2.9 percent since 
then. More recently, this import demand equation has 
improved in its ability to explain the behavior of imports. 
Since 1984, the average wedge has been 1.6 percent. 
What this means is that, while changes in relative prices 
and in domestic demand can explain almost all of the 
change in U.S. imports in a typical year, the wedge of 
40 percent during the Great Trade Collapse was an 
aberration that, at first blush, is hard to explain. 
Faced with this puzzle, Levchenko, Lewis, and 
Tesar (2010) refine their analysis of the trade wedge 
to look as subsectors of the economy. They calculate 
the trade wedge for nonoil imports, durable goods, 
consumption goods, and investment/capital goods. 
The trade wedges for consumer goods (which represent 
around 20 percent of U.S. imports) and for investment/
capital goods (which also represent around 20 percent 
of U.S. imports) are small, –6.4 percent and –10 percent, 63 Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago
respectively. For these sectors, the fall in demand and 
change in the relative prices explain almost all of the 
decline in imports. In contrast, the trade wedge for dura-
ble goods is a sizable –21 percent. While substantial, 
this is considerably smaller than the aggregate wedge 
of 40 percent. Thus, controlling for the composition 
of the trade flow can help explain some of the puzzle, 
and the authors conclude that the unusual behavior of 
trade in intermediate inputs and durable goods must 
be behind some of the unexplained portion of the Great 
Trade Collapse. 
Using industry-level data on the percent change in 
the flow of imports into the United States from June 2008 
through June 2009, Levchenko, Lewis, and Tesar (2010) 
explore three hypotheses for what caused  the Great 
Trade Collapse. First, they study the role of vertical 
linkages in production. Did goods that are used inten-
sively as intermediate inputs in production experience 
large percentage drops in exports and imports? Second, 
they ask how financial constraints affected trade. Spe-
cifically, they analyze whether sectors that extend or 
that intensively utilize trade credit experienced differ-
ential changes in their trade flows relative to sectors 
that do not. Finally, they investigate the role of trade’s 
industrial composition. Was the United States’ trade 
collapse unusually large because it was concentrated 
in goods purchased or sold by sectors that were espe-
cially hard hit during the Great Recession? 
To test these hypotheses, Levchenko, Lewis, and 
Tesar (2010) use data on approximately 450 sectors in 
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In this equation, 
i
trade γ  is the percent change in a 
trade flow from June 2008 to June 2009, CHARi is a 
measure of the industrial sector that will test one of 
the hypotheses (vertical linkages, trade credit, or sector-
level industrial production), and Xi  is a vector of 
industry-specific control variables. 
To test the vertical linkages hypothesis, the authors 
create a measure that captures the intensity with which 
each good is used as an intermediate input in produc-
tion. They use the input–output matrix from the U.S. 
Bureau of Economic Analysis to calculate the average 
amount of a commodity input, i, used to produce a U.S. 
dollar’s worth of output in all downstream industries, 
j. The authors find that goods used intensively as in-
termediate inputs experienced larger percentage drops 
in imports and exports. 
Turning to the hypothesis that tight financial con-
ditions contributed to the Great Trade Collapse, the 
authors calculate two measures of trade credit intensity 
in an industry. Using data from the Compustat North 
America database, they calculate the amount of credit 
extended to a firm by its suppliers as the median ratio 
of accounts payable to cost of goods sold. A second 
measure captures the amount of credit a firm extends 
to its customers—specifically, this is measured as the 
median ratio of accounts receivable to sales.31 For 
example, if a firm that typically extended trade credit 
to its buyers had difficulty obtaining working capital 
from banks during the financial crisis, that firm might 
cease to offer trade credit. Consequently, that might 
have led to a decline in U.S. exports. 
The authors find no evidence that trade flows fell 
more in sectors that typically either extend or receive 
trade credit. An examination of changes over time in 
the ratio of accounts payable to cost of goods sold 
and the ratio of accounts receivable to sales for firms 
in the Compustat database over the periods 2000–
2009:Q1 and 2004:Q1–2009:Q1, respectively, reveals 
that the contractions in trade credit during the financial 
crisis were relatively small. This supports the authors’ 
conclusion that difficulties in obtaining trade credit 
were not a major factor behind the Great Trade Collapse. 
This analysis does not disprove the idea that tight finan-
cial conditions could have contributed to the trade 
collapse. Rather, the analysis indicates that, after con-
trolling for other characteristics, sectors that regularly 
require upfront payments for inputs and sectors that 
regularly ship inputs to buyers in advance of payment 
experienced similar declines in trade. 
Finally, to test the hypothesis that the Great Trade 
Collapse occurred because of compositional differences 
between domestic output and trade, the authors exam-
ine the relationship between the cross-sectional con-
traction in output and the cross-sectional contraction 
in trade. For this analysis, an industry-specific measure 
of industrial production is used as the variable CHARi 
in equation 2. Compositional differences do account 
for some of the Great Trade Collapse, according to 
Levchenko, Lewis, and Tesar (2010). In an examination 
of cross-sectional differences, imports and exports 
contracted more in sectors in which U.S. industrial 
production contracted more. Imports in durable goods 
sectors contracted 9.2 percentage points more than 
imports in nondurable goods sectors. 
In summary, Levchenko, Lewis, and Tesar (2010) 
first quantify that approximately 60 percent of the Great 
Trade Collapse is due to the contraction in domestic 
demand associated with the Great Recession and to 
changes in the relative price of imports to domestic 
goods. They then analyze cross-sectional changes in trade 
flows and conclude vertical linkages and composi-
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trade were important contributing factors to the Great 
Trade Collapse. This partial equilibrium cross-sectional 
approach does not lend itself to quantification of the 
underlying causes of the collapse of aggregate U.S. 
imports. However, from this empirical analysis, we 
can see that a good economic model of the Great Trade 
Collapse must include a distinction between nondurable 
and durable goods and a careful modeling of inputs 
and final goods. 
Eaton et al. (2011)
Eaton et al. (2011) take a different approach to 
studying the Great Trade Collapse. They complete an 
empirical analysis on the Great Trade Collapse as a global 
phenomenon. This paper begins with the observation 
that the ratio of global trade to GDP declined by about 
30 percent from 2008:Q2 through 2009:Q2. In con-
trast to Levchenko, Lewis, and Tesar (2010), who are 
agnostic about the underlying structure of the economy, 
Eaton et al. (2011) build a structural model of the global 
economy. They then use their model to reproduce the 
Great Trade Collapse from possible causes. This 
methodological approach has the additional benefit  
of allowing the authors to quantify the contributions 
of different factors to the Great Trade Collapse. 
Eaton et al. (2011) begin with a standard gravity 
model of trade among 23 countries. This workhorse 
model of the international trade literature relates the 
volume of trade between any two countries to the dis-
tance between them.32 To the gravity model, they add 
three production sectors—durable manufacturing, 
nondurable manufacturing, and nonmanufacturing—
and a detailed input–output structure for each country. 
The possible causes of the trade collapse are included 
in the model as “shocks,” variables subject to exoge-
nous changes in their value that can then propagate 
throughout the model economy. In the Eaton et al. 
(2011) model, there are four distinct types of shocks: 
demand shocks, trade deficit shocks, productivity 
shocks, and trade friction shocks. 
In this paper, a demand shock, which is country-
specific, is a change in the share of final demand that 
is spent on goods from each sector—durables, nondu-
rables, or nonmanufacturing. In this setup, changes in 
final investment activity or changes in durable inven-
tories are captured by demand shocks. The equilibrium 
in this model is a function of each country’s aggregate 
trade deficit and its nonmanufacturing deficit. Because 
the model is static, these trade deficits are treated as 
exogenous shocks. Productivity shocks—which measure 
how much of an output change cannot be explained 
by changes in inputs of capital, labor, and materials—
and trade friction shocks—which capture all kinds of 
changes in barriers to trade—are estimated from data 
on sectoral producer price indexes and bilateral trade 
shares at the sectoral level. The trade friction shocks 
capture anything that changes individuals’ home bias33 
in consumption, such as 1) changes in shipping costs, 
2) changes in tariffs, 3) changes in nontariff barriers, 
and 4) difficulties in obtaining trade finance. Further, 
any reduction in imported inventories associated with 
a large fixed cost of importing—as in Alessandria, 
Kaboski, and Midrigan (2010) discussed later—would 
also be captured by the trade friction shock. 
The authors find that a decline in the demand for 
durable manufactured goods explains 65 percent of 
the decline in the global trade-to-GDP ratio during 
this period. The decline in total demand for durable 
and nondurable manufactured goods explains about 
80 percent of the fall in the global trade-to-GDP ratio. 
Finally, they find that increases in trade frictions  
(difficulties with trade finance and rising trade protec-
tion) reduced trade for China and Japan but had little 
or no impact on other countries. How is it that Eaton 
et al. (2011) find that 80 percent of the trade collapse 
is due to the decline in demand, while a simple im-
port demand analysis implies that declining demand 
can explain only about half of the collapse? A key 
difference between Eaton et al.’s (2011) analysis and 
the import demand analysis in this article or that con-
ducted by Levchenko, Lewis, and Tesar (2010) is that 
Eaton et al. (2011) develop a richer model that incor-
porates important features of the vertical structure of 
trade and production. In their richer framework, a fi-
nal demand shock in one country can fully propagate 
itself through the demand for traded inputs into pro-
duction of both durables and nondurables.
Chor and Manova (2010)
Both Levchenko, Lewis, and Tesar (2010) and 
Eaton et al. (2011) examined demand and supply fac-
tors as possible causes of the Great Trade Collapse, 
and found that weak demand was quantitatively the 
most important factor. A study by Chor and Manova 
(2010) focuses on a supply-side cause by looking at 
the availability of trade financing during the financial 
crisis. When global credit markets froze, the market 
for trade credit tightened, but not nearly as severely 
as other markets. The paper concludes that tighter 
trade financing conditions contributed to the collapse, 
but this contribution was modest. 
Chor and Manova (2010) ask how tight credit  
affected trade volumes. Their empirical analysis of 
the Great Trade Collapse focuses on whether countries 
with higher borrowing costs exported less to the United 
States during the crisis. Their paper exploits cross-
country and intertemporal variation in the interbank 
rate, the interest rate at which banks lend to one another, 65 Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago
to identify if tight financial conditions differentially 
affected different countries’ monthly exports to the 
United States. While the global nature of the financial 
crisis meant that interest rates in different countries 
followed a similar path throughout the crisis, Chor 
and Manova use high-frequency data to capture small 
differences in borrowing costs across countries and 
over time. They hypothesize that countries with lower 
interest rates should have experienced smaller declines 
in the volume of their exports to the United States. 
Consider Chor and Manova’s (2010) simplest 
model—the relationship between U.S. imports from 
different countries, designated i, in different three-digit 
NAICS industrial sectors, designated k, at a monthly 
frequency, t, as a function of the interbank lending 
rate in country i over time. 
3)  ln Yikt = γ1IBRATEit + γ2 Dcrisis  × IBRATEit  + Dkt + εikt ,
where Yikt is U.S. imports from country i in sector k in 
month t, IBRATEit is the interbank rate in country i and 
month t, the variable Dcrisis is a 0–1 indicator variable 
equal to 1 in every month from September 2008 through 
August 2009, the variable Dkt is a full set of sector–
month fixed effects, and εikt is an error term. The co-
efficient γ1 captures the effect of a change in the inter-
bank rate on a country’s exports to the United States, 
whereas the coefficient γ2 captures the additional effect 
of the interbank rate on a country’s exports to the United 
States during the financial crisis. This formulation allows 
for the possibility that the interbank rate might have 
affected trade flows during the crisis in an unusual way. 
From this simple model, Chor and Manova (2010) 
find (in a specification that omits the crisis dummy) 
that a 1 percent increase in the cost of bank financing 
is associated with a 16 percent fall in that country’s 
exports to the United States. However, after control-
ling for industrial production in the exporting country, 
the effect of the interbank rate on exports is generally 
not significant. Thus, while there is some evidence 
that tighter financial conditions, measured as a higher 
economy-wide borrowing rate, was associated with a 
lower level of exports to the United States, it is not 
clear whether this decline in exports was caused by 
tighter borrowing conditions or whether the tighter 
borrowing conditions were simply correlated with 
other adverse changes occurring in these exporting 
economies during the crisis. 
Chor and Manova (2010) then turn to a more re-
fined question of whether sectors that are more reliant 
on financing exported less to the United States during 
the crisis. They exploit cross-sector dependence on 
different types of external financing, together with  
intertemporal changes in the interbank rate, to learn how 
the financial crisis affected trade flows of different 
types of goods. They estimate the following empirical 
model on monthly imports into the United States: 
4)  ln Yikt =  Dit + Dkt + Dik + β1IBRATEit × FINk
 
    + β2 Dcrisis × IBRATEit × FINk + εikt . 
Again, i indexes a foreign country, k indexes a three-
digit NAICS sector, and t indexes time in months. The 
key innovation in this expression, relative to equation 3, 
is the inclusion of the variable, FINk , one of three 
time-invariant measures of financial vulnerability. All 
measures of financial vulnerability are constructed 
from all publicly traded firms in the Compustat North 
America database.34 The authors first calculate the 
average value of the financial vulnerability variable 
for each firm over the period 1996–2005. They then 
use the median value of this average within a sector 
as the sector’s time-invariant measure, FINk. 
The first measure of financial vulnerability that 
Chor and Manova (2010) analyze is the external finan-
cial dependence of a sector. External finance depen-
dence is the fraction of total capital expenditures not 
financed by internal cash flows from operations. Thus, 
we might expect that sectors with high levels of this 
variable would experience greater declines in trade 
flows. The next measure they explore is asset tangi-
bility—that is, the share of net plant, property, and 
equipment in total book value. Because a firm with lots 
of tangible assets can easily provide collateral for a loan, 
one might expect that it is easier for these firms to ob-
tain loans on advantageous terms. Finally, in a setup 
similar to that of Levchenko, Lewis, and Tesar (2010), 
Chor and Manova (2010) examine how access to buyer-
supplied trade credit affects cross-country exports at 
the sectoral level. In their analysis, the change in ac-
counts payable relative to the change in total assets 
measures a sector’s access to buyer-supplied trade credit. 
Chor and Manova (2010) find evidence that sup-
ports the idea that financial difficulties contributed to 
the Great Trade Collapse in the United States, but the 
empirical support for this conclusion is not robust 
across all specifications of their models. Overall, they 
find that 1) sectors that are more reliant on external 
finance had a slightly weaker export performance,  
2) sectors with relatively more tangible assets exported 
relatively more, and 3) sectors that routinely receive 
trade credit from buyers experienced smaller declines 
in their exports to the United States. 
More specifically, when the fraction of total capital 
not financed by internal cash is used as the measure 66 2Q/2011, Economic Perspectives
of financial vulnerability in equation 4, the coefficient 
β1 is identified from the variation in financial depen-
dence across industries within a given country–month, 
the variation in the cost of credit across exporting 
countries in a given sector–month, and the variation 
in the cost of credit over time within a given country’s 
sector. The coefficient β2 relies on the same sources 
of variation in the data for the months of the world-
wide financial crisis. Empirically, the authors found 
that β2 was negative and precisely estimated in almost 
all specifications, but that estimates of β1 were not 
statistically different from zero. This suggests that dur-
ing the financial crisis, high interest rates tended to 
depress U.S. imports in financially vulnerable sectors. 
With regard to the specifications that used the level 
of tangible assets as the financial variable, recall that 
a sector with more tangible assets should be less sen-
sitive to worsening credit conditions because any loan 
it requests can be collateralized by its tangible assets. 
Thus, the authors hypothesize that both β1 and β2  should 
be positive. In fact, they find that β1 is positive in all 
specifications, but statistically significant in only the 
regression that omits the crisis dummy interaction 
term. Further, β2 is positive in almost all specifications, 
indicating that this effect was stronger during the finan-
cial crisis. Thus, exporting firms that faced high borrow-
ing costs performed better if they were in sectors with 
relatively high levels of tangible assets. 
Lastly, Chor and Manova (2010) consider the 
role of trade credit in explaining the Great Trade Collapse. 
These results are most directly comparable to those of 
Levchenko, Lewis, and Tesar (2010), but the two papers 
use different measures of trade credit.35 As stated pre-
viously, one measure of financial vulnerability used 
by Chor and Manova (2010), buyer-supplied trade credit, 
is the change in accounts payable divided by the change 
in total assets. This ratio measures how much credit 
American purchasers in these sectors extend to foreign 
exporters. The positive coefficient estimate on β1 indi-
cates that countries with high interbank rates exported 
relatively more in sectors in which American buyers 
typically extend high levels of trade credit. The positive 
coefficient estimate on β2 indicates that this effect be-
came more pronounced during the crisis. This suggests 
that financial constraints did exacerbate the collapse 
of trade. 
But how do we reconcile the different findings on 
trade credit in Chor and Manova (2010) and Levchenko, 
Lewis, and Tesar (2010)? The two papers exploit dif-
ferent sources of variation in trade flows. Levchenko, 
Lewis, and Tesar (2010) look at differences in the 
provision of trade credit across sectors within the 
United States. Their analysis looks for differences in 
import growth across sectors that are systematically 
linked to differences in trade credit, but does not find 
significant changes in imports that coincide with the 
trade credit measure. In contrast, Chor and Manova 
(2010) exploit cross-country variation in the cost of 
financing within a sector. They compare sectors A and B 
in countries 1 and 2, all of which export to the United 
States. Their analysis finds that if sector A receives a 
relatively high level of trade credit and the interbank 
rate is relatively higher in country 1 than in country 2, 
then the relative exports of sector A to sector B in 
country 1 will be larger than the relative exports of 
sector A to sector B in country 2. This more refined 
analysis is able to capture the subtle effects of financial 
difficulties that varied across countries and over time. 
Finally, Chor and Manova (2010) conduct coun-
terfactual simulations with their model to try to quan-
tify how severe the Great Trade Collapse would have 
been if central banks and national governments had 
not intervened to lower borrowing costs around the 
world. They estimate that U.S. imports in the most  
financially vulnerable sectors would have been substan-
tially lower after September 2008 without the aggres-
sive reduction in interbank lending rates that occurred. 
Alessandria, Kaboski, and Midrigan (2010) 
A final important contribution exploring the causes 
for the Great Trade Collapse is Alessandria, Kaboski, 
and Midrigan (2010). They develop a quantitative  
dynamic model of trade and production to analyze  
the Great Trade Collapse in the United States. Their 
approach is unique in that it focuses on a new channel 
of trade dynamics—namely, the behavior of inventory 
investment over the business cycle. 
Consider the following stylized example that 
Alessandria, Kaboski, and Midrigan (2010) present. 
Suppose a firm would ideally hold three units of a 
good in inventory for each unit that it sells. In other 
words, the firm’s ideal inventory to sales ratio is three. 
If a recession causes the firm’s sales to fall, its inven-
tory-to-sales ratio will increase above its ideal level. 
This would lead the firm to purchase fewer goods from 
its supplier to hold in inventory in the next period. If 
the supplier is a foreign firm and the domestic firm’s 
inventories are all imported goods, then a decline in 
the domestic firm’s final sales in one period will lead 
to a more than proportionate reduction in its purchase 
of imported inventory in the following period. 
Alessandria, Kaboski, and Midrigan (2010) formally 
assess the role of inventory investment during the Great 
Trade Collapse by integrating a partial equilibrium 
model of trade and inventory adjustment into a two-
country general equilibrium model of trade. The key 67 Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago
feature of this model is that if transaction frictions are 
higher for imported inventories than domestic inven-
tories (that is, those purchased from domestic partners) 
so that domestic producers with imported inventories 
target a higher inventories-to-sales ratio, then any shock 
that causes final sales to fall will have a larger effect 
on imported inventories than on domestic inventories. 
Alessandria, Kaboski, and Midrigan calibrate their model 
to U.S. data and find that their model with inventory 
decumulation generates dynamic patterns for production, 
trade, and inventories that are quantitatively similar 
to those observed during the Great Trade Collapse.  
A particularly good feature of this model is that the 
dramatic collapse in imports is followed by a sharp 
recovery, similar to what we have observed for the  
recovery following the Great Trade Collapse. 
Conclusion
The collapse in international trade between the 
second quarter of 2008 and the second quarter of 2009 
is one of the most dramatic features of the Great  
Recession. This collapse in world trade of over 17 per-
cent from peak to trough was massive, not only in terms 
of its U.S. dollar value but also by historical standards. 
The G-20 leaders responded to this dramatic decline 
in trade with three distinct policy initiatives—1) fiscal 
stimulus to support aggregate demand, 2) trade finance 
initiatives, and 3) promises to refrain from new trade 
barriers. To assess the likely impact of these policies, 
we explored in this article three main possible causes 
of the Great Trade Collapse—namely, 1) declining 
demand, 2) financing difficulties, and 3) rising trade 
barriers. Economists have proposed several hypotheses 
to explain the Great Trade Collapse; in addition to the 
three already mentioned, some have posited the fol-
lowing as possible contributing factors: differences in 
the composition of trade and domestic output and the 
behavior of imported inventories. 
Research suggests that declining demand can  
explain between 35 percent and 80 percent of the de-
cline in trade over the period 2008:Q2–2009:Q2. The 
analysis we perform in this article estimates that de-
clining aggregate demand explains 35–50 percent  
of the Great Trade Collapse. With regard to the recov-
ery, our analysis finds a quantitatively larger puzzle; 
rising aggregate demand explains only 25–40 percent 
of the recovery in imports. The decline in aggregate 
income is able to explain a larger fraction of the decline 
in trade in a more sophisticated model that accounts 
for differences between durable, nondurable, and non-
manufacturing output, as well as the vertical structure 
of production. The conclusion that declining demand 
was the major cause suggests that of all the policy ac-
tions, fiscal stimulus likely had the largest impact on 
the trade recovery. 
There is some evidence that financing difficulties 
contributed to the Great Trade Collapse, but the pre-
cise quantitative significance of financial factors is 
difficult to assess. The G-20’s announcement in the 
second quarter of 2009 that it would ensure the avail-
ability of $250 billion for trade finance coincided with 
the nadir of the Great Trade Collapse. However, we 
cannot conclude from the coincidence in timing that 
government aid with trade finance caused the trade 
recovery. It likely had a positive impact that was dwarfed 
by the positive impact of the economic recovery.
There is almost no evidence that trade policy 
barriers rose during the period of trade collapse and 
recovery. Historical experience with trade protection-
ism teaches us that the trade collapse would almost 
certainly have been worse if policymakers had responded 
to the crisis by erecting new barriers to trade. Further, 
it seems that the dramatic demand-driven trade recovery 
was only possible because there were no trade barriers 
in place to impede it.68 2Q/2011, Economic Perspectives
NOTES
1Our calculation is based on data from the Organisation for Economic 
Co-operation and Development’s Main Economic Indicators, in 
which world trade in goods and services is defined as the sum of 
world exports in goods and services and world imports in goods 
and services divided by two; data are from Haver Analytics. 
2For a complete list of G-20 nations, see www.g20.org/about_
what_is_g20.aspx.
3Group of Twenty (2008). 
4Group of Twenty (2009), paragraph 22.
5Ibid., paragraph 6.
6See, for example, Alessandria, Kaboski, and Midrigan (2010); 
Chor and Manova (2010); Eaton et al. (2011); and Levchenko, 
Lewis, and Tesar (2010). 
7For more on the GATT/WTO system, see www.wto.org/english/
thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/fact4_e.htm.
8Deardorffs’ Glossary of International Economics refers to this 
phenomenon as “fragmentation.” Both vertical specialization and 
fragmentation refer to “the splitting of production processes into 
separate parts that can be done in different locations, including in 
different countries” (Deardorff, 2010). 
9We include all countries that have real quarterly trade and GDP 
data series available—27 OECD countries, Brazil, and India meet 
our criteria (see figure 6 for a complete listing).  
10According to the National Bureau of Economic Analysis, the 
Great Recession occurred in the United States in 
2007:Q4–2009:Q2.
11See Miroudot, Lanz, and Ragoussis (2009), table 7, p. 48. 
12A vertically integrated international economy is one in which 
supply chains cross international borders. 
13Economists also estimate the responsiveness of trade to changes 
in the prices of imported goods and services relative to domestically 
produced ones. These estimates are referred to as trade elasticities 
with respect to prices. 
14See Crane, Crowley, and Quayyum (2007) for a detailed discussion 
of trade elasticities. 
15International Chamber of Commerce Banking Commission 
(2010), p. 18.
16The U.S. Department of Commerce, International Trade 
Administration (2008) provides a clear introduction to the  
payment methods used in international trade. 
17International Chamber of Commerce Banking Commission 
(2010), p. 42.
18The findings from these two surveys are reported and analyzed 
in the International Chamber of Commerce Banking Commission 
(2009) and the International Monetary Fund and Bankers’ 
Association for Finance and Trade (2009).
19Data on the number of transactions that took place using 
letters of credit or documentary collections can be obtained  
from SWIFT (Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial 
Telecommunication)—a private provider of electronic financial 
messaging services. However, it is not possible to identify open ac-
count transactions for merchandise trade by using SWIFT data be-
cause there is no SWIFT message code uniquely specified for 
payment for a sale of goods or services. Open account transactions 
for goods are classified under the same SWIFT code as foreign ex-
change sales. For more on SWIFT, see www.swift.com/about_
swift/press_room/SWIFT_for_media_July_2010.pdf.
20International Chamber of Commerce Banking Commission 
(2010), p. 46. 
21Chor and Manova (2010) use data on all publicly traded firms 
in the Compustat North America database to calculate the average 
measure of the ratio of the change in accounts payable to the change 
in total assets for each firm from 1996 through 2005. They then 
take the median value across all firms in a three-digit North American 
Industry Classification System (NAICS) industry as the industry’s 
measure of trade credit. 
22See Chor and Manova (2010), p. 3. Djankov, Freund, and 
Pham (2010) present survey data from 98 countries, indicating  
that the average time for a standardized container of merchandise 
to be transported from a factory floor and cleared for export from  
a country is 30 days. 
23See note 7 for more on the GATT and WTO.
24Prusa (2001).
25For more on this database, which is coordinated by the Centre 
for Economic Policy Research based in London, see  
www.globaltradealert.org.
26See Evenett (2010). 
27 “Capacity utilization is a ratio of a manufacturer’s actual produc-
tion to their full production capability during [a specific time period],” 
states the U.S. Census Bureau; see www.census.gov/manufacturing/ 
capacity/definitions/index.html.
28The amount of trade covered by each unit of observation varies 
considerably—with some investigations covering only a portion  
of a specific tariff line and others covering hundreds of tariff lines. 
That said, this legally defined unit of observation has been used 
consistently since 1980 and is a useful measure for looking at long-
term trends.  
29Measures of an industry’s downstream vertical linkages capture 
the intensity with which the output of an industry is used as an  
intermediate input by other sectors. Measures of an industry’s  
upstream vertical linkages capture the intensity with which that  
industry uses intermediate inputs. (See Levchenko, Lewis, and 
Tesar, 2010, p. 14.) Deardorffs’ Glossary of International Economics 
defines an intermediate input as “an input to production that has  
itself been produced and that, unlike capital, is used up in produc-
tion” (Deardorff, 2010). 
30For example, they calculate the change between the first quarter 
of year t and the first quarter of year t – 1, the second quarter of 
year t and the second quarter of year t – 1, and so on. 
31Both measures in Levchenko, Lewis, and Tesar (2010) first take 
the median value of the variable for each firm in the sample between 
2000 and 2008. Next, they take the median of the value across all 
firms to use as the industry’s measure of trade credit intensity. 69 Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago
32The term gravity model comes from the observation that trade 
volumes tend to increase as the distance between any two countries 
decreases, similar to the force of gravity between two objects in-
creasing as the distance between the objects decreases. In addition, 
this term is also based on the observation that the trade volume for 
an economy grows larger as the size of an economy increases, 
analogous to the gravitational pull of an object becoming larger as 
its mass increases. 
33From Deardorffs’ Glossary of International Economics: Home 
bias is “a preference, by consumers or other demanders, for prod-
ucts produced in their own country compared to otherwise identical 
imports” (Deardorff, 2010). 
34Note that Chor and Manova (2010) are assuming that the financial 
vulnerability in foreign industrial sectors is identical to that of the 
same sectors in North America. 
35The measures used in Levchenko, Lewis, and Tesar (2010) are 
described in detail on p. 63 and in note 31.
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